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ABSTRACT 
Nominal Exchange Rate Pegging, Escape Clauses and 
Targeting of the Real Exchange Rate. (May 2006) 
Pablo Gonzalez, B.S., Universidad Nacional de Cordoba 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Leonardo Auernheimer 
We consider an economy under a fixed exchange rate system, but with bounds (a 
minimum level or a band) on the real exchange rate. The international price of the 
tradable good is characterized by the continuous arrival of shocks that change its level. 
In a model with microfoundations, we investigate the effects of targeting the real 
exchange rate through nominal exchange rate changes that preclude the real exchange 
from trespassing the imposed bounds. 
A stochastic general model with two goods and fixed non-tradable goods price level is 
developed. We analyze the cases in which a lower bound or a band on the real exchange 
rate is introduced. The general conclusion is that when bounds are established, then 
welfare effects can be expected, which are generated at the expense of the levels of 
consumption that go in the opposite direction than what policy intended. This short-run 
effect is present even in the case the targeting policy is never exercised. This result is 
similar to the one we find in the target zones literature, in the sense that just the 
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existence of this tolerance band changes the behavior of the economy. 
An interesting result is that, in the case in which home goods prices are fixed, the 
imposition of the band on the real exchange rate does not change its behavior within the 
band. However, this result is not true of other real variables in the economy. In other 
words, although the targeted variable within the band behaves identically to the case in 
which there are no bounds, the rest of the real variables in the economy behave 
differently, even if the targeted variable remains within the band and the escape clause is 
not triggered. 
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CHAPTER I 
I.INTRODUCTION  
In the recent past, an exogenous pre-announced path of the nominal exchange rate has 
been widely used by developing countries as a stabilization tool –the so-called 
“exchange rate anchor”. In some cases this pre-announced path involved a fixed 
devaluation rate; in others, a fixed level of the nominal exchange rate, including, at 
times, the creation of a currency board, with severe limitations on the central bank’s 
powers –the case of Argentina between 1991 and 2001 probably being the most 
important recent example. 
Although in many of these cases stabilization was achieved, even with a dramatic fall in 
inflation rates, many if not most of these programs were eventually abandoned. The 
“post mortem” discussion suggests different possible reasons for this lack of 
sustainability. In the Argentine experiment of 1978-1981, with a pre-announced path of 
devaluation, the culprit seems to have been of a fiscal nature, with the fixed rate of 
devaluation implying a too low inflation rate and a level of the inflation tax insufficient 
for the financing of the primary deficit –the typical “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” of 
Sargent and Wallace (1985). More frequently, rigidities in home goods prices and 
                                                          
 This dissertation follows the style and format of The American Economic Review. 
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shocks in the price of internationally traded goods generated “too low” a level of the real 
exchange rate (i.e. the relative price of traded goods in terms of home goods), often 
associated with “too high” levels of unemployment, and more often than not with the 
perception of “lack of competitiveness” –a favorite argument, in some quarters, for a 
strong preference for “high” levels of the real exchange rate. In other words, many 
countries, and in particular developing countries, face the conundrum of either benefit 
from the price stability advantage of a strict nominal exchange rate and suffer real or 
perceived losses in economic activity generated by too low levels of the real exchange 
rate, or give up on the benefits of a strict rule and diminish output losses.1/2 As a result, 
either strict exchange rate regimes have been made implicitly conditional on 
“acceptable” low levels of the real exchange rate, or acceptable ranges of the real 
exchange rate have been pursued via the use of other monetary instruments, such as 
interest rates. Notice that a hidden “escape clause” for the case of an otherwise strict 
exchange rate (i.e., a “realignment” of the pre-announced path of the nominal exchange 
rate when too low a level of the real exchange rate is reached) would have an analogue 
in the same implicit clause by which strict monetary policy (i.e., the pre-announced path 
of the money supply) would be modified or abandoned under the same circumstances. In 
this last case, the nominal exchange rate is left to float, but monetary instruments are 
                                                          
1 Drazen and Masson (1994) point out that circumstances can seriously erode the credibility and 
ability of the policy maker to honor his commitment, especially when the policies carried out can 
be blamed for something as highly visible as a persistently high level of unemployment. Along 
the same lines, Blanchard (1985) stresses the historical evidence that even if a government 
wanted to keep its promise about the policy to be followed, it could still be removed from power 
by different means. See Miller and Weller (1989) and Masson (1995) for developed countries 
experiences. 
2 See Neut and Velasco (2003). 
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used to maintain minimum levels of the real exchange rate. The implicit or “hidden” 
escape clauses are justified given the need to preserve “flexibility”.3 
The specification of escape clauses, in various otherwise completely exogenous policies, 
has received some attention in the literature. Flood and Isard (1989), for example, 
discuss escape clauses that allow the policymaker to act different when certain 
previously predefined circumstances are met. 4 
This dissertation attempts to analyze the case in which the central bank follows a strict 
exchange rate, i.e., a pre-announced path of the nominal exchange rate, but subject to an 
explicit conditionality establishing bounds on the levels of the real exchange rate, in the 
form of either a single minimum level or as a band, with both a minimum and a 
maximum “tolerable” level. If those levels are reached, then the central bank would 
proceed to devalue (or revalue) the currency (i.e., to increase or decrease the nominal 
exchange rate) to the extent that it is necessary to preclude the real exchange rate from 
trespassing those limits. In our work, we design an escape clause that takes the most 
restrictive form from the point of view of the policymaker. We define an escape clause 
                                                          
3 Gerlach (1995) uses option pricing theory for valuing that flexibility. Lockwood et al. (1998) 
show that, in that case, keeping the option of using discretion may be optimal when shocks are 
persistent. 
4 Obstfeld (1997) distinguishes between discretionary and non-discretionary escape clauses. The 
former assumes that the policymaker faces a personal cost for making use of the escape clause -
similar to Lohmann (1992)- and then, at discretion, the policymaker can choose what to do, but 
only at a "personal cost" dictated by the final decision. The latter is in line with the more purist 
interpretation of Flood and Isard’s original work. There are well-defined threshold values for a 
monitored variable which indicate to the policymaker what to do according to the observed level 
of that variable. However, even in the case in which the policymaker faces well-defined 
tolerance bands, he may have discretion about how to react, or can receive specific instructions. 
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that would allow the government to realign the nominal exchange rate only if some 
predetermined circumstance were observed. In our case the monitored variable is the 
level of the real exchange rate. More precisely, although the government is committed to 
buying and selling currency at a predetermined rate, if the real exchange rate variable 
reaches a pre-announced level, the nominal exchange rate will actually be adjusted to a 
level that prevents the real exchange rate from surpassing the admissible level. 
This mechanism is similar to that in the exchange rate bands literature, pioneered by 
Krugman (1991), also known as target zones. In Krugman’s work, for example, the 
monetary authority follows a strictly flexible exchange rate system as long as the 
exchange rate stays within a predefined band and only intervenes when the exchange 
rate goes beyond the edges of that band. 
One point must be clarified here before continuing. In the context of our work, the 
escape clause is a well defined contingent rule that the government makes explicit. This 
escape clause summarizes the government's objective function. We assume throughout 
the work that the policy is credible and believed by the public, and fulfilled by the 
monetary authority. Thus, we ignore any kind of time inconsistency problems.  
In order to implement the analysis, we use a rather simple model of a small country that 
is a world taker of both the world price of the traded commodity and the world real 
interest rate. We assume unrestricted, perfect capital mobility, and model the behavior of 
individuals who exhibit rational expectations and maximize the discounted present value 
of their lifetime utility. Although very simple, our model is motivated by microeconomic 
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foundations. In order to motivate the analysis, we will discuss the case in which changes 
in the real exchange rate are brought about by continuous random changes in the foreign 
price (i.e., denominated in foreign exchange) of the traded commodity. 
Despite the simplicity of the model, the treatment of continuous random shocks in 
international prices is not without difficulties, and in discussing the imposition of 
boundaries on the real exchange rate, we need to resort to the very simple, rather naïve 
assumption of the price of home (non-tradable) goods to be constant, with output being 
solely demand-determined –an assumption that can be defended on the basis of some 
short-run rigidities, but which is clearly unsatisfactory in the long run. 
Very much in the same vein as in Krugman’s (1991), at issue here is exploring what 
effects arise from the mere imposition of well defined bounds on the real exchange rate 
even at times whenn those bounds are not reached and the escape clause is not triggered. 
I.1 Related Literature 
Two main branches of the literature are related to the present work. First, from the 
conceptual point of view, this is a model of a purchasing power parity rule or real 
exchange rate targeting. Second, the modeling technique is associated with the literature 
on portfolio choice under uncertainty allowing for welfare evaluation. 
Real exchange rate targeting rules have been used by governments as a device to isolate 
the economy from domestic and external shocks that can weaken the competitiveness of 
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the economy, or simply to obtain a higher real exchange rate, a key relative price of the 
economy5. Dornbusch (1982) used a Mundell-Fleming set-up with overlapping contracts 
to analyze the effects of introducing a real exchange rate targeting policy in the output-
price stability trade-off and concluded that a policy that introduced indexation of the 
nominal exchange rate results in a greater price level instability with an uncertain result 
in terms of output stability.6 
Calvo et al. (1995) used a continuous time representative individual model with a cash in 
advance constraint and flexible prices to show that achieving a higher real exchange rate 
by adjusting the rate of devaluation can only temporarily be attained. However, this is 
only possible at the cost of higher inflation, a higher real interest rate or a combination of 
both, according to the degree of capital mobility. They show that the long-run value of 
the real exchange rate does not depend on the rate of devaluation, leaving no room for a 
higher rate in the long run. However, changes in the rate of devaluation can certainly 
cause a short-run effect. In particular, if the rate of devaluation is perceived to be lower 
in the future, then the nominal interest rate will also be lower, reducing the cost of 
holding money. Therefore, as a consequence of the cash in advance constraint, 
consumption will also be cheaper in the future. Consumption of tradable goods will thus 
be postponed. Since the non-tradable goods sector needs to be in equilibrium, the 
relative price between tradable and non-tradable goods must be adjusted. 
                                                          
5 A complete historical perspective that covers most of the different regimes used in the 20th 
century can be found in Williamson (1981). 
6 Adams and Gros (1986), Lizondo (1991), Montiel and Ostry (1991) and Lizondo (1993) 
conclusions are also on the same line. 
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In recent years a different approach in the literature about adjustable peg systems has 
been developing. Those papers investigate the optimal devaluation policies when the 
government wants to restore the competitiveness of the economy. Among them the work 
by Flood and Marion (1997) is one of the first to analyze the optimal policy decision 
regarding the size and timing of the devaluation. They establish an economy in which 
there exist controls over capital mobility. The private agents’ behavior is exogenous and 
the government minimizes a loss function that considers the cost of real exchange rate 
misalignments and a fixed cost to devaluing. 
In this context, they conclude that there is a positive relation between the drift 
component that governs the real exchange rate and the size of the devaluation to send the 
real exchange rate back to its target level. The idea is that the faster the real exchange 
rate deviates from its target level, the more frequently must the policymaker impose the 
economic and political costs of devaluing. Therefore, when he uses the option of 
devaluing, he tries to set the real exchange rate as far as possible from the lower 
admissible level to avoid paying that cost too often. The volatility of the real exchange 
rate also has a positive relationship with the size of the devaluation. Regarding the 
timing of the devaluation, the theoretical model does not allow them to sign its 
correlation with the drift and variance of the real exchange rate. Empirical evidence for 
Latin American countries over the period 1957-1990 suggested that the drift factor has 
had a negative relation with the timing of the devaluation while the variance has a 
positive correlation that increases with the gap between the target and actual real 
exchange rate that the policymaker is willing to tolerate during the peg. 
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Assumptions about capital controls and the exogenous behaviour of the private agents 
are relaxed in a work by Pastine (2000) under a (S,s) devaluation rule, finding that, 
depending on parameter values such as the degree of capital mobility, the size of the 
political and economic costs of devaluing and those costs caused by the misalignment of 
the exchange rate are low. The probability of devaluation is not monotonic in the target 
variable (the real exchange rate) and the monetary authority can thus deter speculation. 
One possible outcome is that the probability of devaluation decreases as its expected size 
gets bigger. 
Our work departs from the literature in several ways. First, in general there is no trigger 
point on the variable that the government and the public use to evaluate the possible 
implementation of the policy rule. In most of these models, at each point in time, the 
government reacts in such a way that a predefined targeted level of real exchange rate is 
achieved. 
Second, the government does not look for a real exchange above its equilibrium level. 
Moreover, changes in the nominal exchange rate will emerge as a policy response to 
keep the real exchange rate close to its equilibrium level. Consequently it does not apply 
the general approach followed in the real exchange rate targeting literature in which the 
policy consists of adjusting the rate of nominal devaluation with the aim of offsetting the 
gap between a high domestic inflation rate and the lower inflation rate in the rest of the 
world. 
Third, as can be inferred from the introductory section, we do not explore the question of 
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the optimal size and timing of a one-time change in the nominal exchange rate aimed at 
correcting a real exchange rate misalignment. In our work, changes in the nominal 
exchange rate are conducted only when the actual rate reaches the lowest level and the 
size of those devaluations will be just big enough to prevent the real exchange rate from 
perforating the band. The target zones literature mentions this as inframarginal 
interventions. The escape clause rule we use only allows the government to intervene 
when the limit rate is reached. 
The second body of literature related to this dissertation deals with the modeling 
technique. We use a general equilibrium framework with microfoundations in which the 
economy is faced with a permanent series of shocks introduced through a Brownian 
motion process on the foreign price of tradable goods. This allows us to make explicit 
the relevant marginal conditions that individuals in the economy fulfill at each point in 
time while simultaneously understanding how the behavior of the individual affects the 
equilibrium of the whole economy. 
The economy is characterized by the existence of individuals that have the opportunity 
of consuming tradable and/or non-tradable goods, and of allocating their wealth between 
two assets, a foreign bond and domestic money. From this perspective, the model can be 
solved as a portfolio choice problem like those in the celebrated papers by Merton 
(1969) and Merton (1973).  This work follows the main thrust of Asea and Turnovsky 
(1998), Turnovsky and Grinols (1996) and  Venegas-Martinez (2001) with the addition 
that it allows for the analysis of real exchange rate issues in an open monetary economy. 
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One of the virtues of this approach is that it allows for policy evaluation through an 
explicit welfare unit of measure, which is the value function of the dynamic program. 
I.2 Structure of This Work 
The body of this dissertation includes five chapters. Chapter II develops the basic model. 
We assume an economy with fixed non-tradable goods prices and stochastic non 
serially-correlated disturbances to the world price of the tradable goods which may drive 
the real exchange rate away from its targeted level. Individuals have rational 
expectations and derive utility from the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods 
as well as real cash balances. Then, an optimal decision rule is obtained. 
Chapter III analyzes the effects of introducing the escape clause that takes the form of a 
lower bound that the government makes explicit and is committed to obey. Our results 
indicate that the existence of a lower bound can have two opposing effects on welfare. In 
the long run the promise to intervene by adjusting the nominal exchange rate when the 
real exchange rate touches the lowest admissible level ensures a floor on non-tradable 
goods production. This increases welfare in the long run. The smaller the admissible gap 
between the initial real exchange rate and its bound, the higher the expected welfare gain 
in the long run. However, in the short run the probability of intervention in the nominal 
exchange rate reduces the levels of consumption of both goods and the desired demand 
for real cash balances. 
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In Chapter IV we analyze how the results of Chapter III change when a two-sided band 
(i.e., a higher as well as a lower bound) is introduced, maintaining the non-tradable 
goods price rigidity. 
Chapter V explores the consequences of relaxing the assumption of rigid non-tradable 
goods prices, by considering sluggish adjustment instead. When reversion to a 
equilibrium level is allowed for the non-tradable goods price, the welfare effects of the 
escape clause are reduced. 
In Chapter VI, we summarize our conclusions and comment on possible extensions of 
the model and future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
II.A STOCHASTIC MODEL FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
We consider a small open economy with a large number of identical individuals who 
live forever. Individuals derive utility from the consumption of non-tradable goods, 
tradable goods and the services provided by the stock of real money they hold. The 
economy can lend and borrow freely from the world capital market at a fixed world 
interest rate. The government prints money and implements lump-sum transfers.7 
II.1 Individuals 
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods. We 
denote those levels of consumption by cT and cH respectively. They also derive utility 
from the services provided by their money holdings. We define the real money stock in 
terms of the tradable goods, that is 
[1] Mm
E P
=   
where M is the nominal stock of money, E is the nominal exchange rate and P is the 
international price of the tradable good. The nominal exchange rate is defined as the 
                                                          
7 A deterministic version of this model is presented in Appendix A. 
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price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic one. If frictionless arbitrage is 
possible, with no transportation costs and/or customs duties, then the law of one price 
applies to the tradable good, and its price in the domestic currency (T) is given by the 
product of the nominal exchange rate, E, and its price in the rest of the world P, i.e. 
T=EP. 
An individual’s total wealth v, defined in terms of the tradable good, is the sum of real 
money balances m and the stock of foreign bonds b that yield a real interest i, 
[2] Mv b
EP
= + .  
International bonds are denominated in terms of the tradable good. Each individual also 
receives flows XT and XH of tradable and non-tradable goods respectively. We assume XT 
to be constant. They also receive or pay lump-sum transfers dτ. 
We introduce uncertainty in the model through the international price of the tradable 
good. Specifically, we assume that P is exogenously given and evolves according to 
[3] dzPdP   σ= .  
In other words, the international price of the tradable good receives continuous 
independent random shocks dz that are normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
dt. No secular inflation in the price of tradable goods over the instant dt is assumed. The 
diffusion parameter σ is finite and non-negative, i.e. 0≤σ<∞. 
As the international bonds are denominated in terms of the tradable goods, then the 
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return, Rb, is given by the real interest rate i. 
[4]  bR i d t= .  
The real return on money holdings, keeping the nominal exchange rate fixed, is given by 
d(1/EP)/(1/EP), the proportional change on its price in terms of the tradable good. 
Applying Ito´s Lemma, this results in the expression 
[5] dzdtR M σσ −= 2 .  
This expression indicates that the real return on money holdings, in a period of length dt, 
has a deterministic component that is related to the diffusion parameter σ, plus a 
stochastic component given by the process dz governing the international price of the 
tradable good, which has an expected value of zero. 
Therefore, the stochastic return on total individual’s wealth is the weighted average of 
the returns on each of the two assets 
[6] 
2[ (1 ) ]  M M b b M M MR v R v R v v i d t v d zσ σ= + = + − −   
where the weights vM and vb are the proportions of total real wealth that is held in the 
form of money and bonds respectively, 
[7] 1M
Mv
v E P
=      and     b bv v=   
The sum of these portfolio shares must total one 
[8] 1M bv v+ = .  
Under these conditions an individual’s total wealth, defined in terms of tradable goods, 
  
15
 
evolves in accordance with 
[9] ( ) 1 T T H Hd v v R X c X c d t d τε
⎡ ⎤= + − + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   
where  ε = EP/H  is the relative price of the non-tradable good in term of the tradable 
good, i.e. the real exchange rate and H is the nominal price of the non-tradable goods. 
We assume H is fixed8. After some substitutions, the budget constraint can be written as 
[10]      Md v v f d t v v d z dσ τ= − +   
where ( ) ( )2 1 1 1  M M T T H Hf v v i X C X Cvσ ε
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤= + − + − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  
In a stochastic context as the one described in this work, with non-tradable goods price 
fixed, a fixed exchange rate system and the international price of the tradable goods 
following the process given by equation [3], the real exchange rate follows the process 
[11] dzd   εσε =   
with expected variation   Exp(dε)=0   and variance   Var(dε)=ε2 σ2 dt. 
                                                          
8 If the price of the non-tradable goods were fully flexible, the clearing market condition in that 
sector would result in an adjustment of that price that guarantees that the long-run level of 
production would be always attained. In the other extreme, a fixed price level allows for 
departures from the long-run level of production on the non-tradable goods sector, keeping the 
economy out of its equilibrium forever. As it is generally accepted, some markets present a 
certain level of price rigidity (among the possible explanations are the overlapping contract 
arguments and the existence of monopolistic competition, for example). A logic assumption is 
that althought the price of the non-tradable goods can depart from its long-run level, there exists 
some degree of price flexibility that allows this price to converge to its long-run value over time. 
We adopt the fixed price assumption for tractability purposes and, consequently, the results we 
find have to be interpreted as limited to the very short run. We make some conjectures about the 
effects of introducing non-tradable goods price sluggishness in Chapter V. 
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II.2 The Government 
For this work we define government as the conglomerate of the fiscal and monetary 
authorities. The government also has a stock of foreign assets, bG, that renders the real 
interest rate i, and prints fiat money, M. As we do not intend to study the effect of the 
government’s fiscal position, the government sector is kept at the simplest level. We 
assume that government’s consumptions of both tradable and non/tradable goods are 
equal to zero. The government also implements lump-sum transfers, which are 
denominated in terms of the tradable good. There are no distortionary taxes implemented 
and the monetary regime is characterized by a hard peg, i.e. the monetary authority 
commits to buying and selling money at the predetermined nominal exchange rate E.  
The government’s real net wealth vG is the difference between the stock of foreign assets 
it holds and the real money stock held by the public, expressed in terms of the tradable 
good 
[12] G G
Mv b
E P
= −   
Its stochastic wealth accumulation equation, the budget constraint, is given by 
[13] 2G G G M G
M M Mdv b R R d b i dt dz d
EP EP EP
τ σ σ τ⎛ ⎞= − − = + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
The government’s per capita transfer policy is defined by 
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[14] 2 G
M Md ib d t d z
E P E P
τ σ σ⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
In other words, the government returns to the public, in a form unrelated to their money 
holdings, the revenues from money creation plus the interest it earns on its holdings of 
international bonds. 
II.3 The Individuals’ Problem 
Individuals’ preferences are defined over tradable and non-tradable goods consumption 
as well as the real money stock they hold. These preferences are summarized by a 
strictly increasing, concave and continuously differentiable utility function U(cH,cT,m) 
that satisfies the usual Inada conditions, 
0
lim ( , , )H Tj U c c mj→
∂ = ∞∂  and 
lim ( , , ) 0H Tj U c c mj→ ∞
∂ =∂  for j=cH, cT ,m. We assume both goods are perishable. The 
individuals’ problem can be defined by choosing the optimal consumption cH and cT and 
the portfolio allocation policy (ie. vM and vB) to maximize the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functional at t=0 
[15] ( ) ( ) 0, , ,
0
[ 0 , 0 , 0 ] ( , , )
H T M b
t
H T Mc c v v
v M a x E x p U c c v v  e  d tρε
∞
−⎡ ⎤Ω = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
where ρ is the rate of time preference that is assumed to be constant, Exp0 is the 
expectation operator conditioned on all information available at t=0, and subject to the 
stochastic behavior of wealth accumulation [10], along with the stochastic process 
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governing the real exchange rate [11] and the wealth constraint [8]. The initial stock of 
wealth v(0)=v0 and real exchange rate level ε(0)= ε0  are given. The solution method we 
follow is that of dynamic programming. 
Given the exponential time discounting, the value function can be assumed to have a 
time separable form 
[16] ( , , ) ( , )tv t e J vρε ε−Ω =   
In this case, applying the differential operator L9, one can write 
[17] 2 2 2 2 21 1 1[ ( , )]      
2 2 2
t t
v vv vL e J v e J g v J v J J v J
ρ ρ
εε εε ρ σ ε σ ε σ− − ⎛ ⎞= − + + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
where the subscripts v and ε refer to partial derivatives.10 
Therefore, the individuals’ objective is to select the rates of consumption for each good 
and their portfolio shares to maximize the Lagrangian expression 
[18] ( , , ) [ ( , )] (1 )t tH T M b MU c c vv e L e J v v v
ρ ρ ε− −+ + Λ − −   
The corresponding optimality conditions with respect to cH, cT, vB, vM and Λ are given by 
[19] 0vH
J
U ε− =   
[20] 0T vU J− =   
[21] 0=Λ−   
                                                          
9 See Turnovsky (1997 Chap. 9). 
10 For notational convenience, we suppress the arguments of the value function J. 
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[22] ( )2   0m vU v v i Jε σ− − − Λ =   
[23] 1 0b Mv v− − =   
After some manipulations, we find the marginal conditions that must be fulfilled at all 
times 
[24] HT U
U =ε   
[25] ( )2
1
T mU U i σ= −   
The two equations described above have clear and meaningful interpretations. Equation 
[24] expresses the usual condition for an optimal choice. In this case, it means that the 
marginal utility of the consumption of tradable goods divided by its relative price have 
to equal the marginal utility of the consumption of the non-tradable good. In other 
words, for any given level of the consumption of the tradable goods, we can derive the 
demand of the non-tradable good as a function of the relative price between these two 
goods. Equation [25] has a similar interpretation, in the sense that a demand function for 
real money holdings that depends on the cost of holding that stock of money for a period 
of length dt can be obtained. Equations [19] and [20] indicate that the marginal utility of 
consuming one extra unit of the good must equal the marginal valuation that one could 
have derived from saving those resources and consuming them in the future, i.e. the 
marginal valuation of the state variable v. 
For this work, we assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and concave 
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individual utility function of the form 
[26] γβαβαγ )(
1),,( 1 −−= mccmccU THTH   
where 0<γ<1 and (1−γ) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. The 
coefficients α, β and  (1−α−β) measure the relative weights of each of the arguments in 
the utility function. This CRRA utility function with money as an argument fulfills the 
necessary regularity conditions required to be functionally equivalent to the cash-in-
advance-constraints or the transactions-cost approaches to modeling a monetary 
economy (see Turnosvky and Grinols (1996) and Feenstra (1986)). We also choose this 
particular form for the utility function in the interest of keeping the problem manageable 
and deriving closed-form solution in those cases where that is possible. 
Simple manipulation of equations [19]-[22] and [26] results in the marginal conditions 
that must be fulfilled at all point in time. Those conditions are 
[27] TH cc  εβ
α=   
[28] 
( )
( )2
1
Tm ci
α β
β σ
− −= −   
That is, for a given level of consumption of the tradable good, the consumption of non-
tradable goods is a function of its relative price, the real exchange rate. Expression [28] 
is the demand for real money stock as a function of the opportunity cost of holding it. 
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II.4 The Resource Constraint for the Aggregate  Economy 
Consolidation of the private sector and the government results in the balance of payment 
identity 
[29] [ ( )] T TdV iV X c dt= + −   
where the V is the sum of private sector’s (v) and government’s (vG) real wealth (or 
equivalently, the sum of the foreign bond hold by each sector). Notice that the 
expression above is the usual balance of payment equation we find in a model with no 
uncertainty and it indicates that for the external sector to be in equilibrium, the interest 
earned by total non-monetary domestic wealth should be enough to finance the balance 
of trade flow. Note that even in the case of this stochastic environment, equation [29] is 
non-stochastic. This is a consequence of assuming that the international bonds are 
expressed in terms of the tradable goods and, therefore, changes in the nominal price of 
that good in the international market do not affect the aggregate economy’s level of 
wealth. 
It should also be noticed that once you know the level of wealth in this economy, there is 
one and only one level of consumption of tradable goods cT that is consistent with 
equilibrium in the balance of payment. Therefore, the marginal condition [24] (or [27] in 
the particular case of the utility function we have chosen) and the market clearing 
condition for the non-tradable goods sector leads to the conclusion that there exists one 
  
22
 
and only one equilibrium level of the real exchange rate ε. That level is denoted as εF, 
and the correspondent production level of non-tradable goods is denoted as FHX .  
In a context characterized by sticky prices, misalignments of the real exchange rate are 
possible. In this work, those out-of-the-equilibrium values for the real exchange rate are 
generated by a fixed price of the non-tradable goods11 and a continuously moving price 
for the tradable goods. Hence, when the latter is lower (higher), the real exchange rate 
becomes higher (lower). In the case the non-tradable goods sector is demand-
determined, the level of production of those goods is lower (higher) than its long-run 
equilibrium state. 
II.5 The Solution of the Model 
The value function of the problem, additionally, must satisfy the Hamiltonian-Jacobi-
Bellman equation [30] 
[30]  { ( , ,  )  [ ( , ) ]} 0t tH T MM a x U c c v v e J e H v
ρ ρ ε− −+ =   
where we replace the optimized values for cH, cT and m in the utility function. We reach 
for a solution for  J(v,ε) that solves the resulting differential equation. 
We define the total amount of resources (in terms of the tradable good) that the 
individual needs to allocate to get utility U(.) as 
                                                          
11 In fact, only the lack of fully flexible prices is necessary. 
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[31] ( )2H TcG c m i σε= + + −   
and the ratios of each of the components of the utility function with respect to the 
function G as 
[32] 
( )2
 
H T
H T m
m ic cg g g
G G G
σ
ε
−= = =   
where 1=++ mTH ggg . 
After several manipulations using marginal conditions [27] and [28] it can be shown that 
the consumption of both types of goods and real money holdings are proportional to G 
[33] 
( )
( )2
1
   H Tc G c G m Gi
α βα ε β σ
− −= = = −   
Substituting [33] in the utility function [26] we obtain an expression for the utility 
function that depends on parameters and G only, 
[34] ( ) 121 1, ,H TU c c m G i
γα β
α α β α βε α βγ σ
− −⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
  
As noted before, the solution to the problem consists of finding a function J(v,ε) that 
satisfies the marginal conditions [19]- [22] and the Bellman equation [30]. A candidate 
solution to that problem has the form 
[35] ( , )  J v A v γ φε ε=   
where the constants A and φ have yet to be determined. 
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Using the condition [20], the CRRA utility function [26], and the candidate function [35] 
we obtain an expression for the utility function that can be rewritten as 
[36] ( ) (1 ) (1 )1 121 1, ,H TU c c m A vi
γ
α β γ βγα β γ γα βγα β εγ σ
− − − −− −− − −⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
  
Finally, using [36], [35] and its derivatives into the Hamiltonian-Jabobi-Bellman 
equation we conclude that a possible solution for the candidate function [35] exists only 
if φ = γα. After several manipulations that involve equations [20], [26], [33], we obtain 
an expression for G of the form 
[37] 
(1 ) 1
2
1G A v
i
γ
α β γα β α βγα β σ
− − − −
− −⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
  
and the equation 
[38] 2 2 2
1 1 1( 1) ( 1) 0
2 2 2
G f
v
ρ γ σ γ γ σ φ φ σ γφ− + + − + − − =   
It should be noted that imposing the markets clearing condition in the non-tradable 
goods sector, the transfer policy and [33], the expression for f in [10] reduces to 
[39] 2
1
T
Gf i X
v v
σ β= + + +   
The optimal decision rule for G can be found by using equation [39] in [38] 
[40] 2 2 2
1 1 1 1( 1) ( 1)
1  2 2 2
TXG v i
v
ρ γ σ γ γ σ φ φ σ γφβ γ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − + − − − − +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦   
The optimal levels of consumption and the optimal portfolio can be found using [7], [8] 
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and [33]. Hence, given that φ = γα <1, the level of G in the face of uncertainty (which in 
our setup implies σ2>0) can be shown to be higher than when the source of uncertainty 
is not present (setting σ2=0). 
The constant A can be found by substituting the result from [40] back into equation [38] 
[41] 
1 (1 )1 1GA
v i
γγ α β
α β α βα βγ
− − −⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
  
Therefore, the function 
[42] ( , )  J v A v γ αγε ε=   
is the solution for the differential equation on J(v,ε) that satisfies the marginal conditions 
[19]- [22]. The optimal choices for cH, cT, vB, vM can be derived using [7] and [33]. 
Notice that G is a function of a set of parameters and the state variable v. The real 
exchange rate ε does not enter in that function. Therefore, the level of consumption of 
the tradable goods and real money holdings are completely determined without reference 
to the real exchange rate. 
The equilibrium solution must satisfy the feasibility condition. This is simply the 
transversality condition 
[43] lim [ ( , ) ] lim [ ( , ) ] 0t tvt tExp vJ v e Exp J v e
ρ ρε ε− −→ ∞ → ∞= =   
By Ito´s Lemma and using [10] and [11] we find 
[44] ( )2 2 2( , ) 1 1 1( 1) ( 1)
( , ) 2 2 2
dJ v f dt dz
J v
ε γ σ γ γ σ φ φ σ γφ φ γ σε
⎡ ⎤= + − + − − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
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which means that 
[45] ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2
1 1 1( 1) ( 1)
2 2 2, , , , 0
tf t z
J v t J v e
γ σ γ γ σ φ φ σ γφ φ γ σε ε
⎡ ⎤+ − + − − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦=   
Replacing this expression in the transversality condition and applying the expectation 
operator we can easily show the expression  
[46] 2 2 2
1 1 1( 1) ( 1) 0
2 2 2
fρ γ σ γ γ σ φ φ σ γφ− − − − − + >   
By equation [38], this ensures that the levels of G and the choice variables are all 
positive. 
As a summary and illustration of the results, Figure 1 shows the demand of money and 
the consumptions of tradable and non-tradable goods. Clearly, as the function G does not 
depend on the real exchange rate, money holdings (the m line, which is measured in the 
secondary axis of the figure) and the consumption of tradable goods (the Ct line) have 
flat paths, i.e. they are independent of the level of real exchange rate observed in the 
economy. To understand the intuition behind these results, one should note that when the 
exchange rate regime is a fully credible hard peg, there is no risk of changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, and consequently the opportunity cost of holding money stays 
constant. As the level of consumption of tradable goods is determined by the external 
sector, where no changes have occurred, the demand for money must be constant. The 
Ch line shows how the consumption of non-tradable goods reacts to changes to its 
relative price with respect to tradable goods, i.e. the real exchange rate, a result that 
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comes from the marginal condition that relates the consumptions of tradable and non-
tradable goods. 
ε
m
Ct
Ch
mC
t,C
h
Figure 1 
Consumption of tradable, non tradable goods and real money holdings 
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CHAPTER III 
III.INTRODUCING A LOWER BOUND ON THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
Under a fixed exchange rate system, misalignment of the real exchange rate can be 
generated by changes either in the world price of the tradable good or in the price of the 
non-tradable good. In either case some lack of flexibility in the non-tradable goods price 
needs to be assumed12. If this element is not present, then, just after receiving the shock, 
the non-tradable goods price will instantaneously adjust so that consumption at each 
point in time of the non-tradable goods will equal its full employment level of 
production, and the economy will be always at its long-run equilibrium. 
In the previous chapter we assumed that the world price of the tradable goods P is 
continuously exposed to shocks. The extreme assumption, that the non-tradable goods 
price was fixed was also made for tractability purposes. Therefore, the real exchange rate 
ε evolved according to [11].  
Consequently, if we define the target level of the real exchange rate ε* and the nominal 
                                                          
12 One rationale for this, and one not all too uncommon in the economic literature, is the 
existence of overlapping contracts of different "ages" at a given point in time. There are two 
consequences of the existence of these contracts. One is that if there is an unexpected change in 
the economy, the contract upon renewal introduces the new equilibrium price. But those that are 
still in effect need to wait until the expiration date to adjust their price. As a result, the average 
price in the economy shows a delayed adjustment toward the new equilibrium price. The other 
effect is that, in anticipation of a future change, the contracts that are going to be in effect after 
the event takes place are going to adjust their prices in advance. 
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exchange rate is fixed, then there exists one and only one value for P that is compatible 
with that level of the real exchange rate. 
In this Chapter, we analyze the case in which there exists a lower bound on the real 
exchange rate.13 The general idea is that the government, in a context characterized by 
fixed non-tradable goods price, decides to set a minimum level of non-tradable goods 
production with the aim of avoiding lower levels of production in that sector. This lower 
bound or limit can be interpreted as a representation of the society distaste for 
unemployment. In other words, a restriction to the stochastic process that governs the 
motion of the real exchange rate is introduced. An escape clause with the following 
specification is introduced: the government uses the nominal exchange rate to realign the 
real exchange rate if and only if it reaches a predefined level that is considered too low. 
More specifically, the exchange rate policy implies a commitment to keep the nominal 
rate fixed as long as the real exchange rate is above the lowest admissible valueε, but as 
soon as this boundary is reached, the government is commanded to adjust the nominal 
exchange rate so that the real exchange rate is not below the established lowest 
admissible value. 
In general, the complete solution to any differential equation includes the particular and 
complementary solutions. The first gives the equilibrium value of the general equation. 
                                                          
13 The case of a band targeting on the real exchange rate is analyzed in next chapter. We first 
introduced a lower bound rule for two reasons. First, because it allows to understand the effects 
that arise for the existence of a bound in a simpler setup. Second, because, generally, the 
concerns about the real exchange rate level grow when that variable is below its long-run level. 
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The second provides the dynamic behavior of the equation relative to equilibrium, 
indicating how the system evolves towards or away from the equilibrium. This 
complementary solution results from solving the homogeneous part of the same 
equation, which is given, in this case, by 
[47] 2 2
1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0
2v
J v f J v J vεερ ε γ ε σ ε ε− + + =   
As we did before, we need to guess the solution. A candidate solution function for this 
problem has the form 
[48] ( , )  J v K v γ ωε ε=   
Using the correspondent partial derivatives, and solving for ω we obtain the complete 
solution for our differential equation given by 
[49] 1 21 2( , )J v Av K v K v
ω ωγ γα γ γε ε ε ε= + +   
where 
[50] ( )[ ]q±+= γω 1
2
1
2,1    and    ( ) ( )2 28( )1 4 1 fq ρ γγ γ γ σ
−= + + − +
 
are the roots that solve the complementary solution. The two of them are real and of 
different signs provided that  ρ-fγ>0. The constants K1 and K2 remain to be determined. 
For convention, denote the negative root as ω1. 
Let us recall the Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equation we solved has the form 
[51] 2 21( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0
2
t t t t
H T vU c c m e e J v e fvJ v e J v
ρ ρ ρ ρ
εερ ε ε σ ε ε− − − −− + + =  
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This expression can be rewritten as 
[52] ( , ) ( , , ) [ ( , )]H TJ v dt U c c m dt Exp dJ vρ ε ε= +   
As pointed out by Dixit (1993 pp.14-15), this is an arbitrage equation in which J(v,ε) is 
the value of the entitlement to a flow of utility. It can then be interpreted as a capital 
asset. If the asset is held over a period (t,t+dt), then the normal return is given by the 
left-hand side of the equation [52]. On the other side of the equation, we have that the 
asset yields a dividend of U(.)dt and an expected capital gain of size Exp[J(v,ε)]. If no 
arbitrage possibilities are present, then this last equation holds. This also means that, in 
the absence of barriers (restrictions on the stochastic process), as the one described in 
Chapter II, the particular solution [42] is the complete solution to the problem and the 
constants K1 and K2 equal zero. 
When barriers are present, then the complementary solution should capture their effect, 
and the constants K1 and K2 are determined according to the kind of barrier imposed in 
the problem.14 These are the cases analyzed in this and the next chapters. 
III.1 Changes to the Basic Model 
As before, the general rule the government follows is an exchange rate rule. However, at 
a predefined and publicly known level of the real exchange rate (associated with a too 
                                                          
14 See Dixit (1993). 
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low level of non-tradable goods production) it is mandated to exercise the necessary 
adjustment to the nominal exchange rate to avoid allowing the real one to go beyond its 
lowest admissible level. Under this rule, the nominal exchange rate follows a process 
that can be represented by 
[53]  LdE E dN=  
where the regulator dNL is a non-negative non-decreasing process that is only positive 
when the real exchange rate hits the predefined lower level. It is equal to zero elsewhere 
and involves infinitesimal accommodations of the nominal rate to keep the real exchange 
rate just at that lowest admissible level. NL stands for the cumulative interventions on the 
nominal exchange rate. 
Because of those interventions of the monetary authority changing the nominal exchange 
rate at the edge of this one-sided band, small accommodations of the individuals’ real 
money stocks occur. Then, the instantaneous real return to money holdings is given by a 
modified version of expression [5] 
[54] 2M LR d t d z d Nσ σ= − −   
For simplicity, we assume the government’s revenues from the realignment of the 
nominal exchange rate are returned to the public as part of the lump-sum transfers. 
Finally, the real exchange rate behavior needs to be redefined too. The proportional 
changes originally represented by equation [11] should include possible corrections to 
the nominal exchange. The real exchange rate follows the process 
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[55]    Ld d z d Nε σ ε ε= +   
The newly defined problem to be solved has a similar setup as the one analyzed in the 
previous section, with the only differences given by equation [53], and equations [54] 
and [55] in replacement of [5] and [11]. As the procedure to solve the system follows the 
same steps that were followed in the previous Chapter, we just present the main 
differences. 
III.2 The Escape Clause and the Smooth-Pasting Condition 
For the particular problem at hand, the escape clause constitutes a lower bound on ε. In 
other words, ε is allowed to follow the process described by [55] as long as ε>ε, but if 
ε=ε, then the next increment cannot be negative. This is referred to as a reflecting barrier 
at ε. 
Suppose for a moment that the real exchange rate ε follows a path that goes further from 
the targeted level ε as time passes. In this context, it is unlikely that the real exchange 
rate will reach the lower admissible level ε in a reasonable time span. In that case, the 
particular solution should be a more relevant part of the complete solution of [49]. Recall 
we assumed ω1<0 and ω2>0. So, the last term on the right hand side of [49] goes to 
infinity as the real exchange rate increases. This result contradicts the idea that the 
particular solution should be a good approximation to the problems as the real exchange 
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rate increases, unless K2=0. On the other hand, the term in [49] that contains the constant 
K1 gets smaller as ε reaches higher levels. That is, the effect of this part of the 
complementary solution vanishes as the monitored variable gets further from its lower 
admissible level ε, and gets more influential when ε approaches ε. So it seems logical to 
allow that term to be present in the complete solution of the differential equation. 
So far, we have established that K2=0 and K1≠0. The precise value of K1 will be 
determined by endpoint conditions that come from the existence of this reflecting lower 
barrier. In particular, that condition is given by the smooth-pasting condition.15 
[56] 11 11 1( , )   0J v A v K v
φ ωγ γ
ε ε φ ε ω ε− −= + =   
Solving for K1 we find 
[57] 11
1
K A φ ωφ εω
−= −   
and the complete solution of the differential equation is16 
[58] 1 1
1
( , )  J v A v A vφ ω ωγ φ γφε ε ε εω
−= −   
The presence of the lower bound for the real exchange rate in equation [58] implies that 
it is not inconsequential for the economy. In the next section, we analyze those 
                                                          
15 For an intuitive explanation of the smooth-pasting condition see Krugman (1991) and Dixit 
(1993 pp. 26-27). Malliaris and Brock (1982 pp. 200) provide a formal derivation. Applications 
of this condition can be found in Constantinides (1986), Dixit (1989), Merton (1973) and Dumas 
(1992) among others and is frequently found in the literature on option pricing and investment 
under uncertainty. 
16 The underlining of J means this is the solution form for the case of a lower band in the real 
exchange rate. 
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consequences. 
III.3 Long and Short-Run Effects of the Lower Bound Policy 
Policy evaluation needs the development of a welfare criterion. In our case, short and 
long-run effects of the policy under consideration can be selected. In particular, the 
instantaneous utility function and its lifetime version evaluated at the optimal path are 
the natural candidates for this purpose. 
For the latter, expressions [58] and [42] are the relevant ones for the cases of an 
economy with and without a real exchange rate lower bound, respectively. 
Notice that equation [58] can be written as 
[59] ( , )  J v A v γ φε ε=   
where 
[60] 
1
1
1A A
φ ωφ ε
ω ε
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
Clearly, any difference in the long run on welfare expected at time zero with and without 
the escape clause is explained by the term between square brackets in [60]. That term is 
definitively positive provided that ω1<0. That is, the existence of a known lower limit on 
the real exchange rate, in this context with fixed prices of the non-tradable goods, is a 
welfare improving measure. 
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Figure 2 compares the levels of welfare attained under a permanent fixed exchange rate 
(line NB) and a nominal exchange rate defined by the lower bound on the real exchange 
rate (line 1B).17 As can be observed, the level of welfare attained under the existence of  
1729.000
1749.000
1769.000
1789.000
NB
1B
J(
v,
ε)
ε L
 
Figure 2 
Expected welfare under no targeting and a lower bound 
the lower bound on the real exchange rate is higher than an exchange rate policy with no 
target on the real exchange rate for any level of the real exchange rate. Notice that the 
difference is smaller as the real exchange rate reaches levels further from its lowest 
                                                          
17 The relevant parameter values to generate the figures are: α=β=1/3, γ=0.5, ρ=i=0.01, 
σ=0.01, b=0.9 and v(0)=10.000. These parameters are kept constant for the rest figures included 
in this work, unless a change is specifically mentioned. 
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admissible level.18 
The short-run effects of the policy can be evaluated by using the marginal condition [20] 
once again. After several manipulations, it can be determined that  
[61] 
( )
1
1/ 1
1
1G G
γφ ωφ ε
ω ε
− −−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
which is lower than G, provided that 0<γ<1 and the term between square brackets is 
bigger than one. The level of consumption of tradable goods, and also of non-tradable 
goods and money holdings, are lower than when no lower bound exists. 
To understand the result discussed in the previous paragraph it is necessary to recognize 
the effects of the lower bound at the individual level. In particular, as the real exchange 
rate approaches its lowest admissible level, the probability of a realignment of the 
nominal exchange rate grows. For example, suppose that the observed real exchange rate 
is at the level ε. If no lower bound exists, then the probability of facing a devaluation, 
i.e. a change in the level of the nominal exchange rate, equals zero (provided that the 
shock to the real exchange rate has an expected value equal to zero) and the expected 
value for the real exchange rate is ε. Figure 3 shows a probability distribution for the 
possible value of the real exchange rate. Now suppose that there is a lower bound policy 
                                                          
18 We run a simulation that involved generating 10,000 different random paths for the real 
exchange rate and computing the expected welfare level under a hard peg and three different 
levels of the lower bound on the real exchange rate.  Both standard errors and covariances of the 
series were estimated by bootstrapping. At a 99% confidence level we rejected the null 
hypotheses that the expected welfare attained under the hard peg and each of the different lower 
bounds was equal. Moreover, the expected welfare gains were bigger as the level of the lower 
bound was increased. 
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under effect and that the observed real exchange rate in the economy equals that lower 
bound, which we call ε. In this case, the probability of facing a devaluation equals 50% 
and it is given by area B. Under the lower bound policy, individuals know that the 
monetary authority will never let the real exchange rate to go to the left of ε in Figure 3 
and that it will react by a devaluation of the necessary size to keep in the real exchange 
rate at ε. The probability distribution of the real exchange rate is truncated, such that the 
new probability distribution is the sum of areas A and C, and the expected value of the 
real exchange rate is now higher than ε. In the event that the next shock triggers a 
devaluation, the instantaneous return on money holdings is reduced. This effect is 
associated in the above expression by the term (ε/ε) that measures the distance between 
the actual real exchange rate and the edge of the band. In other words, now the variables 
that the individuals control (especially the demand for real cash balances) are sensitive to 
the real exchange rate and they act accordingly. 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the optimal levels of real money holdings, the consumption of 
tradable and non-tradable goods under the two alternatives schemes for conducting the 
nominal exchange rate. They clearly show that for any level of the real exchange rate, 
the existence of the lower limit in the real exchange rate makes individuals consume less 
of both types of goods and hold lower stocks of real cash balances. 
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Figure 3 
Random shocks on the real exchange rate and the probability of a devaluation 
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Figure 4 
Real money holdings under no targeting and a lower bound 
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Figure 5 
Consumption of tradable goods under no targeting and a lower bound 
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Figure 6 
Consumption of non-tradable goods under no targeting and a lower bound 
  
41
 
A lower level of consumption allows for a greater level of wealth that is made in form of 
foreign bonds and will ultimately provide the economy with a higher level of welfare. 
However, this welfare improving policy has contemporaneous effects. With the aim of 
avoiding possible “too low” levels of production in the non-tradable good sector, caused 
by an “inconvenient” level of the real exchange rate, the policy generates the necessary 
contradictory incentives in the private sector. The contingent devaluation policy reduces 
the expected gains from holding money and brings a contraction in the level of activity 
compared to the case where no lower bound exists. This effect is present even in the case 
when that lowest tolerance limit is not ever reached, as it is observed in the previous 
figures. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IV.THE CASE OF A REAL EXCHANGE RATE BAND 
In the previous chapter we assumed that the government was only concerned about a 
drop in the real exchange rate that can worsen the level of production in the non-tradable 
goods sector. This assumption allowed for a great simplification to understand first the 
consequences of introducing uncertainty over the path of the world price of the tradable 
goods, secondly, it allowed the examination of the effects of a policy that at first did not 
tolerate, and then imposed, limits on the size of the misalignment in the real exchange 
rate with respect to its targeted level. 
In this chapter, we analyze a different scenario, by introducing a band on the real 
exchange rate, holding the assumption of a fixed price level in the non-tradable goods 
market. This upper limit to the real exchange rate represents the aversion of the 
government to an inflationary process derived from external shocks and its commitment 
to keep the real exchange rate as close as possible to its long-run equilibrium level. 
IV.1 A Band on the Real Exchange Rate 
As in Chapter III, the government is committed to a fixed exchange rate, but the 
government decides to keep the option of an automatic realignment of the nominal 
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exchange rate if the real exchange rate reaches either a lower or an upper admissible 
level. If the real exchange rate touches the lower bound, then the government proceeds 
to devaluate in a magnitude such that the real exchange rate stays at that lower limit. On 
the other hand, the government automatically revalues when the upper limit is reached. 
As a consequence of this policy the nominal exchange rate follows a process given by  
[62] ( ) L HdE E dN dN= −   
where the regulator dNL is the  non-negative non-decreasing process introduced in 
equation [53] and dNL is the  non-negative non-increasing regulator that is only positive 
when the real exchange rate hits it predefined admissible upper level. Both regulators are 
equal to zero when the real exchange rate fluctuates within the band and involves 
infinitesimal accommodations of the nominal rate to keep the real exchange rate just at 
the edges of the band. NL stands for cumulative devaluations and NH stands for 
cumulative revaluations. 
The general solution to the problem follows the same steps described in the previous two 
chapters with the difference that now the return on money holdings and the process for 
the real exchange rate are given by 
[63] 2M L HR d t d z d N d Nσ σ= − − +   
and 
[64] ( )   L Hd d z d N d Nε σ ε ε= + −   
respectively. 
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As before, we assume the government’s revenues from the realignment of the nominal 
exchange rate are returned to the public as part of the lump-sum transfers. 
Now the two constants on the right hand side of [49], K1. and K2 will be determined by 
endpoint conditions that come from the existence of the reflecting barriers. In particular, 
a system of two equations (the two smooth-pasting conditions) renders 
[65] 
22
2 11 21
1
K A
φ ωω φ
ω ωω ω
φ ε ε ε ε
ω ε ε ε ε
−= −  and 
1 1
2 11 22
2
K A
ω φ ωφ
ω ωω ω
φ ε ε ε ε
ω ε ε ε ε
−= −  
where ε and ε  are the lower and upper limit for the real exchange rate. The complete 
solution of the differential equation takes the form 
[66] 
( )
( )
( )
( )
22
1
2 11 2
1 1
2
2 11 2
1
2
( , )  1
                                              
J v A v
φ ωω φ
ω φγ φ
ω ωω ω
ω φ ωφ
ω φ
ω ωω ω
ε ε ε εφε ε εω ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε εφ εω ε ε ε ε
−
−
⎡ −⎢= + +⎢ −⎣
⎤− ⎥+ ⎥− ⎦
 
In the next section we analyze the effects of the existence of the band on the real 
exchange rate. 
IV.2 Effects of the Real Exchange Rate Band 
Once again, a welfare criterion needs to be used to evaluate the effects of the band on the 
real exchange rate. Given the complexity of equation [66], we proceed by simulating the 
value function J(v,ε) under three different scenarios: no targeting at all, a lower bound 
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(εL) and a symmetric band (εL −εH) on the real exchange rate. The function is represented 
in Figure 7. The thin NB-line shows the level of welfare attained under the no targeting 
scheme. The dotted 1B-line clearly shows the gains in terms of welfare (the vertical 
distance between the 1B and the NB lines) of introducing a lower limit to the real 
exchange rate, as explained in Chapter III. 
The S-shaped thick 2B-line represents the welfare attained at different levels of the real 
exchange rate within the band. As it should be expected, there is a cap on the welfare 
function, a straight result from the smooth pasting condition. The more valuable 
information is the reduction on the welfare gains the economy reaches when the real 
exchange rate approaches the lower band. That effect arises because even if the real 
exchange rate approaches that lowest admissible level and the probability of a 
revaluation gets smaller because the real exchange rate is getting further from its upper 
limit, that probability is always different from zero. On the other hand, when the real 
exchange rate is above the desired level, the existence of an upper limit eliminates the 
realization of states in which the production of non-tradable goods is expanded and 
consequently a permanent fixed exchange rate would have been a better alternative. 
One important point to be remarked is the fact the even if the real exchange rate is at its 
long-run equilibrium level, there are still welfare gains generated by the establishment of 
the band. A sensitivity analysis practiced on the welfare function shows that the size of 
these welfare gains are correlated with the parameter of risk aversion γ. The more risk-
averse the individual is, the higher the welfare gains are. Individuals have a relatively 
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higher valuation for limiting the bad outcomes generated by a “too low” real exchange 
rate. 
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Figure 7 
Expected welfare under no targeting, a lower bound and a band 
Summarizing, the band on the real exchange rate lessen the welfare improvement we 
observe when just a lower bound is imposed to the real exchange rate. 
For the analysis of the short-run effects, the optimal level for the arguments of the utility 
function can be used. Figures 8, 9 and 10 present those values for real money holdings 
and the consumption of the tradable and non-tradable goods, respectively. These 
variables are related by the marginal conditions presented in equations [25], [26] and its 
proportionalities with respect to G, expressed by [31]. Once G is obtained, the three of 
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them can be determined. The figures show that level of the real exchange rate closer to 
the lower (upper) limit of the band generates lower (higher) levels of utility than if no 
band existed and the nominal exchange regime was that of a hard peg. 
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Figure 8 
Real cash balances under no targeting, a lower bound and a band 
An important consideration to be made is that the existence of the band on the real 
exchange rate does not influence the real exchange rate itself within the edges of the 
band, in contrast to the classical result expected in the target zone literature. With a 
nominal exchange rate that is kept fixed within the band, the assumption of fixed price 
level of the non-tradable goods, the only source of changes in the real exchange rate is 
provided by changes in the international price of the tradable-goods, which is 
independent of the nominal exchange rate regime. However, under the existence of the 
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band, the real exchange rate acts as a device that transmits information about the 
probability of future changes in the nominal exchange rate, forcing individuals to correct 
their consumption of both goods and the level of real cash balances they want to hold. 
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Figure 9 
Consumption of tradable goods under no targeting, a lower bound and a band 
As a way to better understand the effect of the band we simulated four different possible 
paths for the real exchange rate. Figure 11 details the behavior of the real exchange rate, 
the consumption of tradable goods, the level of wealth and the consumption of non-
tradable goods under two different decreasing paths of the real exchange rate. On the 
left, we assume that the real exchange rate approaches the lower bound of the band 
asymptotically. On the right, we let the real exchange rate follow a random path, but 
with a decreasing trend. We observe that a low real exchange rate induces individuals to 
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consume less of both types of goods compared to the case of the pure hard peg regime 
(the NB line). That reduction on the levels of consumption is smaller in the case of the 
band (the 2B line) compared to the case of having just a lower bound on the real 
exchange rate (the 1B line). Reduced levels of consumption allows for the accumulation 
of wealth in both cases. An interesting observation is the fact that eventually the higher 
level of wealth may produce a level of consumption of both types of goods higher than 
in the case of a pure hard peg regime. 
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Figure 10 
Consumption of non-tradable goods under no targeting, a lower bound and a band 
In a similar way, Figure 12 details the behavior of the real exchange rate, the 
consumption of both types of goods and the level of wealth but now, under increasing 
paths of the real exchange rate: one that approaches the upper bound of the band 
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asymptotically (on the left) and another that follows a random path, but with a increasing 
trend. In the case of the existence of a band on the real exchange rate, the conclusions 
are exactly in the opposite direction compared to what it is observed in Figure 11. 
However, when only a lower bound is established, the paths for the consumption of 
tradable goods and wealth remain the same. These results come from the fact that under 
this regime, there is always a positive probability of facing a devaluation, but there does 
not exist a possibility of a revaluation. In that case, individuals reduce the demand for 
money, as well as the consumption of both types of goods, compared to the hard peg 
regime. These changes allow for wealth accumulation even in the case in which the real 
exchange rate departs from its lowest admissible level. 
Finally, Figures 13 and 14 show how the welfare function behaves under the permanent 
fixed exchange rate regime and the band scheme respectively, when the variance of the 
process that moves the international price of the tradable good increases. In Figure 13 we 
observe the benefits of a lower variance in terms of expected welfare. The welfare 
function shifts upwards as the dispersion parameter σ gets lower, an intuitive result for a 
risk averse individual. In the case of Figure 14, it can be observed that the welfare 
function under a band scheme move counterclockwise as the variance of shocks 
decreases. A careful observation of the figure shows that the welfare function 
approaches the welfare function of the hard peg regime when the variance decreases. A 
lower variance reduces the probability of hitting the band in a reasonable time span and 
of a necessary correction of the nominal exchange rate. 
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Figure 11 
The economy under a downward path of the RER 
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The economy under an upward path of the RER 
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Figure 13 
The variance of the shock and expected welfare under no RER targeting 
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Figure 14 
The variance of the shock and expected welfare: a band on the RER 
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CHAPTER V 
V.SLUGGISH ADJUSTMENT IN NON-TRADABLE GOODS PRICE 
As explained before, some degree of price stickiness is necessary for allowing the real 
exchange rate to depart from its long-run equilibrium level. The assumption that the 
price of non-tradable goods was fixed we used previously allowed us to understand the 
effects of the targeting rules. This assumption yielded a great simplification. 
In this chapter, a sluggish adjustment replaces the fixed non-tradable goods price 
assumption and analyzes how the benchmark model of Chapter II changes when we 
allow for some degree of price flexibility. This specification is sufficient to guarantee 
that the targeted real exchange rate is reached in expected terms in the long run, even 
without intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
V.1 Modeling Non-Tradable Goods Prices 
As explained in section II.4, for a given level of wealth of the whole economy, there is a 
unique level of consumption of tradable goods that satisfies the transversality condition 
and the equilibrium in the external sector (equation [29]). For that level of consumption 
of tradable goods, there is one and only one level of the real exchange rate that results in 
the long-run full employment level of activity in the non-tradable goods market. That 
level of the real exchange rate εF is determined by the marginal condition [24]. As the 
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relative price between tradable and non-tradable goods decreases, non-tradable goods 
become more expensive and then, in a demand determined market, the level of 
production of non-tradable goods is lower than the long-run equilibrium level. This 
result needs the crucial assumption that the price level of these goods is not fully 
flexible. In previous chapters, zero flexibility was assumed and it stayed fixed. However, 
it seems intuitively appealing to accept that although non-tradable goods prices can not 
adjust instantaneously, at least they can adjust with some lag. To be more specific, we 
can assume that the price of the non-tradable goods adjusts deterministically toward their 
long-run equilibrium level at a rate that is proportional to the gap between the actual and 
the long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate, that is 
[67] ( )FdH H dtκ ε ε= −   
Equation [67] means that, if the relative price of the non-tradable goods in terms of 
tradable goods is “too high”, then the proportional rate of change of the price of the non-
tradable goods is negative and eventually it converges to a level compatible with full 
employment. Notice that this rate of inflation in domestic goods prices is not constant 
over time and gets smaller as the economy approaches its long-run equilibrium. 
In accordance with the definition adopted for the real exchange rate, in an economy 
under a hard peg nominal exchange rate regime, such as the one described in previous 
chapters, the proportional rate of change of the real exchange rate should be determined 
by the difference between the proportional changes in tradable and non-tradable goods 
prices. Using Ito’s Lemma, 
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[68] ( )     Fd dt dzε κ ε ε ε σ ε= − +   
This expression adds into equation [11] a deterministic component to the price level of 
non-tradable goods. Let us recall that the price of the tradable goods follows a 
completely stochastic path described by the process in equation [3]. In that case, it was 
assumed that the drift parameter was equal to zero, meaning that the “deterministic” 
inflation rate equals zero in the rest of the world. Given that expected dz equals zero, 
expression [68] means that the expected proportional change in the real exchange rate is 
just the correction of the price level of the non-tradable goods toward its equilibrium 
level. In an extreme case, equation [11] can be interpreted as the limiting case when 
κ→0. That is, the rate of adjustment to the equilibrium level is extremely low. 
Technically, equation [68] has the form of a geometric mean-reverting stochastic process 
for the real exchange rate. This kind of processes is frequently used in derivatives and 
option pricing theory and theory on investment under uncertainty. The literature on 
exchange rate bands has also been extended to allow for mean-reversion. In that case, 
the reverting process applies to the value of the fundamentals that determine the 
exchange rate. In particular, Delgado and Dumas (1992) model fundamentals following 
an arithmetic-mean-reverting process and concentrate on explaining the effects of 
varying the width of the band. Special attention is devoted to analyzing the smooth 
pasting conditions for finding the solution to the resulting stochastic differential equation 
for the exchange rate. Other applications for exchange rate bands, both nominal or real, 
can be found in Froot and Obtsfeld (1991), Miller and Weller (1991), Tristani (1994) 
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and Knot et al.(1999). In all cases, it is recognized that the tractability of the problem can 
be seriously compromised and that intuitive interpretation of the results becomes more 
difficult when mean-reversion is added. 19 Often numerical simulations are needed.20 
Even more, closed-forms solution are not always possible and it is sometimes necessary 
to use numerical methods for solving the differential equation. 
V.2 Solution to the Model Under a Permanent Hard Peg 
To start with, the consumer’s problem is the same as before with a unique change in the 
law of motion for the real exchange rate that behaves according to equation [68], instead 
of equation [11]. Notice that changes in the nominal price of the non-tradable goods do 
not affect the real money stock that individuals hold. As a consequence, neither the 
return on money holdings nor the individual’s budget constraint change (see equations 
[5] and [10].) 
                                                          
19 See Bartolini and Dixit (1991) for an application regarding the market value of a debt when 
the borrower’s ability for repayment varies stochastically. Their work includes a detailed 
appendix that shows carefully the solution procedure for stochastic differential equation with 
mean-reversion properties. Metcalf and Hassett (1995) compare investment decisions where the 
price of the good sold by a firm follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) versus a 
Geometric Mean-Reverting process (GMR). After simulation, they conclude that GBM performs 
almost like GMR. The trade off between the more realistic GMR and the simplicity of the GBM 
is resolved in favor of the latter due to its tractability. 
20 In general, when the problem involves a differential equation in which only one variable 
follows a Wiener process after some variable transformations, the original differential equation 
can be written as a Kummer equation that has the form 0')(" =−−+ ayycbcy , where a,b,c are 
constants. The solution to this Kummer equation is the confluent hypergeometric function 
...
!3)2)(1(
)2)(1(
!2)1(
)1(1),,(
32
+++
++++
+++= c
bbb
aaac
bb
aac
b
acbaM  For additional properties of the confluent 
hypergeometric function refer to Slater (1965) or Andrews (1997, Chapter 10). 
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However, the non-constant drift component for real exchange rate behavior does affect 
the expression for the value function [16] and its differentiation according to the 
differential operator used in [17]. In particular and by application of Ito differentiation, 
the last expression will include an extra term reflecting the effect of this new 
deterministic component in the behavior of the real exchange rate. More specifically, the 
function [  ( , )]tL e J vρ ε−  now has the following form 
[69] 
2 2
2 2 2
1[ ( , )] [    
2
1 1                                              ( )   ]
2 2
t t
v vv
F
v
L e J v e J f v J v J
J J v J
ρ ρ
ε εε ε
ε ρ σ
κε ε ε ε σ ε σ
− −= − + + +
+ − + −
 
The procedure for finding the solution follows the steps developed in Section II.3. The 
first order conditions are the same as in [19]- [22]. Consequently, the marginal 
conditions that must be fulfilled at each point in time do not change. 
However, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation now includes an extra term related to 
the actual real exchange rate gap, causing the ratio G/v of equation [40] to be replaced by 
[70] 11 ( )
1  
FG G κ ε ε φβ γ
⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
r
 
It has to be noticed that now the optimal policy regarding the level of G as a proportion 
of wealth is no longer constant and varies with the size of the misalignment of the real 
exchange rate with respect to its long-run equilibrium level. In particular, the lower the 
observed real exchange rate is, the lower the ratio G/v. That is the short-run consequence 
of introducing a reverting-to-equilibrium process in the non-tradable-goods price level. 
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To derive the long-run effect it is necessary to find the value of the parameter A of the 
guess function [35], which results in 
[71] ( ) 11
1
FA A
γφ κ ε εβ γ
−⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
r
  
This parameter is no longer constant and changes with the size of the misalignment of 
the real exchange rate. 
As in the previous section, we proceed by using simulations of the value function to 
evaluate the effects of the sluggish adjustment on the non-tradable goods price level. 
Figure 15 shows the result for a permanent fixed exchange rate regime with and without 
adjustment on the level of the non-tradable goods prices. Introducing non-tradable goods 
price sluggishness makes the welfare function move clockwise. For any level of the real 
exchange rate, the level of welfare attained is closer to its long-run equilibrium level. 
For a real exchange rate that is below its long-run level, the economy with fixed non-
tradable goods prices performs worse than one that allows at least a gradual adjustment 
to equilibrium. In other words, the ability of the price of the non-tradable goods to 
adjust, such that its long-run level of production can be reached, results in reduced 
(increased) levels of consumption in the short-run when the real exchange rate is below 
(above) its long-run level, but with higher (lower) expected discounted welfare in the 
long run. 
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Figure 15 
Expected welfare under fixed and sluggish adjustment in non-tradable goods price 
(the benchmark) 
Some attention may be necessary to understand the short-run effect. Suppose that the 
observed real exchange rate is below its long-run level, meaning that its price is too high 
in terms of tradable goods and the level of production will be below its long-run level. 
Accordingly, downward pressure on the price level of those goods should exist. That is 
what equation [67] states. Given that the non-tradable goods price level is expected to go 
down, the real exchange rate starts to rise (see equation [68]). This means the relative 
price of the non-tradable goods in terms of the tradable goods decreases. As individuals 
expect non-tradable goods to become cheaper in the future, they optimally decide to 
delay their consumption with the aim of maximizing present discounted utility. This 
result is along the same lines as Calvo et al.(1995) when they analyze the effect of a 
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transitory change in the rate of nominal devaluation. The process works the other way 
around when the real exchange rate is above its long-run level, creating incentives for 
present consumption and reducing welfare in the long run. 
V.3 Conjectures on the Effects of Targeting Rules 
As explained before, when no barriers are imposed on the real exchange rate and the 
government lets it float freely under a permanent fixed nominal exchange rate regime, 
the particular solution given in the previous section is the appropriate solution for the 
differential equation given by the dynamic programming problem. In the case the 
government decides to prevent the real exchange rate from deviating too far from a 
certain predetermined level, the complete solution for the differential equation at hand 
should be the sum of the particular and the complementary solution that results from 
solving the homogeneous part of that differential equation.21 That requires finding the 
roots that solve the homogeneous equation. In the case non-tradable goods price is 
allowed to revert to its long-run equilibrium level, those roots are both real and of 
different sign 
[72] ( )1,2 21 2 ( )12
F
qκ ε εω γ σ
⎡ ⎤−= + − ±⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
r r
 
                                                          
21 Note that under this set up the dynamics of the real exchange rate also changes so that [69] is 
replaced by ( )     F Ld dt dz dNε κ ε ε ε σ ε ε= − + + , where dNL is the regulator 
introduced in section III.1. 
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[73] where    ( ) ( )
2
2 2
2 ( ) 8( )1 4 1
F fq κ ε ε ρ γγ γ γσ σ
⎡ ⎤− −= + − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
r
        22 
[74] Following the steps developed in Chapters III and IV, the constants 1K
r
 and 
2K
r
 are determined by the smooth-pasting conditions mentioned in Sections III.2 or 
IV.1.23 The tractability of the problem at hand becomes complicated and closed-form 
solutions cannot be derived. For these reasons, we use the result of the previous section 
to infer the possible effects of a lower bound or a band policy under sluggish adjustment 
of the non-tradable goods price. 
When only a lower bound is established, a natural question that arises regards the level 
of the policy variable ε. In Section III.3, it was determined that the existence of the lower 
bound policy is a welfare improving policy in the long run. In particular, those long-run 
welfare gains are bigger as ε becomes higher. More specifically, one might be interested 
in the case in which the government targets a level higher than the long-run equilibrium 
level. 
Under the assumption of a fixed level of price of the non-tradable goods in Chapter III, 
the answer to the last question is unambiguous. No limit on the real exchange rate lowest 
admissible level exists. The higher that level is, the bigger the long-run welfare gain is. 
However, the conclusion changes when reversion to long-run equilibrium is allowed in 
                                                          
22 We assume that  1 0ω <r   and  2 0ω >r . 
23 When deriving 1K
r
 and 2K
r
, it has to be considered that A
r
, 1ωr , and 2ωr  are functions of the 
actual real exchange rate level. 
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the non-tradable goods price level. In this case, the government forces the real exchange 
rate to be above its long-run equilibrium level and consequently it imposes a lowest 
positive inflation rate in the non-tradable goods sector. That lowest limit is given by the 
expression 
[75] ( )1 FdHdt Hπ κ ε ε= = −                             where 0Fε ε> >  
As the non-tradable goods price level present a trend to rise over time (in expected 
terms), hence the real exchange rate follows the inverted path with downward pressure 
always present. Permanent inframarginal devaluations will be needed to prevent the real 
exchange rate from perforating the band, resulting in an expected path for the domestic 
price of the tradable goods higher than if the target did not exist and in a lower desired 
level of real cash balances by the public. This result is along the lines of the traditional 
literature on real exchange rate targeting mentioned in Section I.1 in the sense that a 
policy that tries to impose a higher than the long-run equilibrium level of the real 
exchange rate leads to price level instability. 
In the case that the monetary authority establishes a lower and a upper bound in the real 
exchange rate, it is important to understand that the sluggish adjustment in the price of 
the non-tradable goods reduces the needs for nominal exchange rate realignments. The 
adjustment in the mentioned price level helps the real exchange rate to return to its level 
compatible with full employment in the non-tradable goods sector. In some way, we 
could say that the adjustment process works in the same direction as the band, in the 
sense that, as it approaches the lower (upper) bound, it increases the expected value of 
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the real exchange rate. Individuals take that information into account and lessen their 
reaction to the existence of the bounds. 
To summarize, when the price of non-tradable goods is allowed to follow a reverting 
process to its level compatible with long-run equilibrium, welfare gains or losses are 
reduced compared to the fixed price level case. This result is in line with the 
conventional wisdom that higher degrees of price flexibility increase welfare. However, 
in the short-run this generates lower (higher) levels of activity when the real exchange 
rate is below (above) its equilibrium level, an effect that takes into account the expected 
future path of the relative price between tradable and non-tradable goods. It has also 
been shown that targeting a level of the real exchange rate higher than its equilibrium 
level results in a non-negative rate of inflation with welfare reducing effects. 
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   CHAPTER VI 
VI.CONCLUSIONS 
Targeting of the real exchange rate has been analyzed in the literature following two 
different lines. The most traditional one investigates managed nominal exchange rate 
systems (with either a fixed nominal rate or a fixed rate of devaluation) where 
government is concerned about loss of competitiveness due to domestic inflation rates 
higher than in the rest of the world and hence a low or decreasing real exchange rate. In 
such an environment, more often than not the policy responses are sizable devaluations 
or increases in the rate of devaluation. The conclusion in this branch of the literature is 
unambiguous in the sense that attempts to maintain a real exchange rate higher than the 
equilibrium level lead to accelerating inflation. 
A second branch explores the competitiveness issue in the standard context of a band 
(target zone) on the nominal exchange rate, where the escape clause takes the form of 
changes in monetary policy once the band limits are reached. In an economy with 
sluggishness in the price of home goods, movements in the nominal exchange rate 
within the band correspond to movements in the real exchange rate, and, in a sense, the 
establishment of the bounds can be motivated by the ultimate goal of limiting extreme 
changes in the real exchange rate.  
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Our work is intended as a step toward the integration of those lines of research. We 
consider an economy under a fixed exchange rate system, but with bounds (a minimum 
level or a band) on the real exchange rate. In our analysis, the international price of the 
tradable goods is characterized by the continuous arrival of shocks, and these permanent 
shocks are the source of shocks to the real exchange rate. In a model with 
microeconomic foundations, we investigated the effects of targeting (imposing bounds 
on) the level of the real exchange rate, in an environment otherwise characterized by an 
"exchange rate rule" which takes the simple form of a constant level of the nominal rate. 
When movements in tradable goods prices cause the real exchange rate to reach the 
bound(s), government resorts to changes in the nominal exchange rate in order to 
preclude the real rate from trespassing the bound(s). The difference between our 
approach and the "traditional" approach as described above is, then, that here 
government intervenes only when a predetermined bound is reached, and that when it 
intervenes, it does so following a well-established rule. The modeling technique, on the 
other hand, is the same as in the floating exchange rate target zones literature. 
The most general conclusion of our work is that when bounds are established, then 
welfare gains can be expected, but that those gains in expected welfare are generated at 
the expense of levels of consumption that go in the opposite direction to that intended by 
the policymaker. Another general conclusion is that the effects bounds on real variables 
are present even in the case in which the bound is never reached and hence the targeting 
policy is never exercised --the same result as in the target zones literature, in the sense 
that the mere existence of the bound changes the behavior of the economy. 
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Chapter II developed, as the benchmark case in which there is a strict exchange rate rule 
and no escape clauses, a stochastic general model with two goods and fixed non tradable 
goods prices. The fixed price assumption, which intends to capture short run effects, is 
introduced in order the keep the tractability of the problem. 
Chapter III analyzes the case in which a lower bound on the real exchange rate is 
introduced. It shows that the existence of the lowest tolerance limit on the real exchange 
rate, which reduces the range over which the level of activity in the non tradable goods 
sector can fluctuate, is a welfare improving policy in the long run, in terms of expected 
welfare. However, the short run effect is a lower level of production vis-à-vis the 
benchmark case with no escape clause. 
The case of a band on the real exchange rate is analyzed in Chapter IV. The upper bound 
is introduced both for reasons of symmetry, and as a representation of the government's 
intention of avoiding extremely high levels of production in the non tradable goods 
sector and its distaste for high inflation rates associated with increasing levels of the 
international price of tradable goods. The results show that the welfare effects depend on 
the initial level of the real exchange rate. For levels closer to the lower bound, the 
welfare consequences are the same as in the case of a simple lower bound, but they are 
of smaller size. On the upper edge of the band, with an initial exchange rate above the 
center of the band, the policy can be welfare reducing. 
An interesting --even initially intriguing-- result, true in both the cases of a lower bound 
and a band, is that although the "targeted" variable (the real exchange rate) has exhibits 
  
68
 
exactly the same behavior within the band as it would in the benchmark case of no band 
(since non-tradable goods prices are fixed), the same is not true of the other real 
variables in the economy. In other words, although the targeted variable within the band 
behaves identically as the benchmark case in which there is no band, the rest of the real 
variables in the economy behave differently, even if the targeted variable remains within 
the band and the escape clause is never triggered. This is interesting because in the case 
of a band on a floating nominal exchange rate, this exchange, which is the target, 
behaves differently inside the band from the case when the band doesn't exist. In our 
case the targeted variable (the real exchange rate) does not behave differently (which 
might mislead the careless observed), but the rest of the real variables do. 
The assumption of sluggish adjustment of the price of non tradable goods to some long-
run equilibrium value makes the problem analytically intractable when bounds on the 
real exchange rate are imposed. In Chapter V, we analyze once again the benchmark 
case but with sluggish rather than fixed prices of the non tradable good. By observing 
the effects of price sluggishness on the benchmark case, we develop some conjectures 
about the possible outcomes when a lower bound or a band is imposed. Sluggishness in 
price adjustments moves the economy toward outcomes closer to the full flexibility case, 
and reduces the occurrence of states in which a realignment of the nominal exchange 
rate can be necessary and from that point it plays a welfare stabilizing role. We therefore 
conjecture that when the price of non tradable goods is allowed to follow a reverting 
process to some predetermined level, welfare gains or losses are reduced compared to 
the fixed price case, as well as the changes with respect to consumption and portfolio 
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allocation decisions. 
We should mention some caveats and shortcomings. The assumption of a fixed arbitrary 
price of non-tradable goods, while providing some insights for the short-run, is clearly a 
shortcoming, and future work should aim at considering a model in which there is a 
well-defined level of non-tradable goods output (the "full employment") level, perhaps 
in the context of a slightly simplified model. Another shortcoming is the assumption of 
the world real interest rate being the same as the fixed rate of time preference --an 
assumption used in many papers, which simplifies matters but does not yield a single, 
unique real exchange rate of equilibrium. 
The ultimate purpose of our research is to contribute to the understanding of the effects 
of imposing escape clauses on an environment of rational expectations, and in this sense 
there are many areas and policies in which those effects need to be further understood 
and which could provide a natural agenda for future research. Closer to the themes of 
our study, though, some well-defined areas appear as natural candidates for immediate 
future research. The main one is, probably, the analysis of which is the optimal width of 
the band around the long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate and, eventually, 
the analysis of what the optimal policy response would be following a "regime" or 
structural change", i.e., a once-and-for-all change in the equilibrium real exchange rate 
requiring the reposition of the band. 
Another aspect to be considered in the future is a more general definition of the real 
money stock. In this work we have defined the real money stock in terms of traded 
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goods. 
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APPENDIX A 
A DETERMINISTIC MODEL FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
UNDER PERFECT CAPITAL MOBILITY 
A small open economy with a large number of identical individuals who live forever is 
considered. Individuals derive utility from consumption of non-tradable goods, tradable 
goods and the services provided by their stock of money holdings. The economy can 
lend and borrow freely from the world capital market at the world interest rate. The 
government prints money and implements lump-sum transfers. 
A.1 Individuals 
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods. We 
denote those levels of consumption by cT and cH respectively. They also derive utility 
from the services provided by their holdings of money. We define the real money stock 
in terms of the tradable goods, that is 
[A-1] Mm
E P
=  
where M is the nominal stock of money, E is the nominal exchange rate and P is the 
international price of the tradable good. The nominal exchange rate is defined as the 
price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic one. If frictionless arbitrage is 
possible, with no transportation costs and/or customs duties, then the law of one price 
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applies to the tradable good, and its price in the domestic currency (T) is given by the 
product of the nominal exchange rate, E, and its price in the rest of the world P, i.e. 
T=EP. 
An individual’s total wealth v, defined in terms of the tradable good, is the sum of real 
money balances m and the stock of foreign bonds b that yield a real interest i, 
[A-2] Mv b
EP
= + .  
International bonds are denominated in terms of the tradable good. Each individual also 
receives flows XT and XH of tradable and non-tradable goods respectively. Initially, we 
assume that both are constant. They also receive or pay lump-sum transfers τ. 
With the assumptions detailed above, the budget constraint of the typical individual, 
expressed in terms of the traded goods, is given by the expression 
[A-3] ( ) ( )1 ˆ ˆ T T H Hdm db X C X C m E P ibdt dt ε+ = − + − − + +   
where 1ˆ dEE
dt E
=  and 1ˆ dPP
dt P
=  are the proportional changes over time of the 
nominal exchange rate and the international price of the tradable goods, respectively. 
ˆ ˆE P+  is the domestic rate of inflation in the tradable goods market. Finally, ε = EP/H is 
the relative price of the non-tradable good in term of the tradable good, i.e. the real 
exchange rate. 
We define the proportions of total real wealth that a typical individual holds in the form 
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of money and bonds respectively as 
[A-4] 1M
Mv
v E P
=      and     b bv v=   
The sum of these portfolio shares is equal to one 
[A-5] 1M bv v+ = .  
Therefore, the individual’s budget constraint can be rewritten as 
[A-6] ( ) ( ) ( )1 ˆ ˆ 1T T H H M Mdv X C X C vv E P i v vdt ε= − + − − + + − .  
A.2 The Government 
We define government as the conglomerate of the fiscal and monetary authorities. The 
government has a stock of foreign assets, bG, that yields the real interest rate i, and prints 
fiat money, M. We assume that the government’s consumptions of both tradable and 
non/tradable goods are gT and gH, respectively. The government also implements lump-
sum transfers, which are denominated in terms of the tradable good. There are no 
distortionary taxes implemented. Its wealth accumulation equation, the budget 
constraint, is given by 
[A-7] ( )ˆ ˆG HT Gdb gdm m E P g ibdt dt τε− = + − − − +   
The government’s per capita transfer policy is defined by 
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[A-8] ( )ˆ ˆ HT Ggdm m E P g ibdtτ ε= + + − − +  
A.3 The Individuals’ Problem 
Individuals’ preferences are defined over tradable and non-tradable goods consumption 
as well as over their real money holdings. These preferences are summarized by a 
strictly increasing, concave and continuously differentiable utility function U(cH,cT,m) 
that satisfies the usual Inada conditions, 
0
lim ( , , )H Tj U c c mj→
∂ = ∞∂  and  
lim ( , , ) 0H Tj U c c mj→ ∞
∂ =∂  for j=cH, cT ,m. We also assume both goods are perishable. A 
typical individual’s problem can be defined by choosing the optimal consumption cH and 
cT  and the portfolio allocation policy (ie. vM and vB), at any initial time t=0, to maximize 
[A-9] ( )
0
[ 0 , 0 ] ( , , ) tH T Mv U c c v v  e  d t
ρ
∞
−Ω = ∫   
where ρ is the rate of time preference that is assumed to be constant, and subject to the 
equation of wealth accumulation [A-6] and the wealth constraint [A-5]. The initial stock 
of wealth v(0)=v0 is given. 
After some manipulations, we find the marginal conditions that must be fulfilled at all 
points in times 
[A-10] HT U
U =ε   
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[A-11] ( )1ˆ ˆT mU U i E P= + +   
[A-12] 0T
dU
dt
=  
Assuming, as we did in Chapter II, a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and 
concave individual utility function of the form 
[A-13] γβαβαγ )(
1),,( 1 −−= mccmccU THTH   
where 0<γ<1 and (1−γ) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, the 
marginal conditions that must be fulfilled at all points in time result in the expressions 
[A-14] TH cc  εβ
α=   
[A-15] 
( )( )
1
ˆ ˆ T
m c
i E P
α β
β
− −= + +   
[A-16] 0T
dc
dt
=   
The equations described above have clear and meaningful interpretations. Equations [A-
14] and [A-15] express the usual condition for an optimal choice. In the case of equation 
[A-14], it means that the marginal utility of the consumption of tradable goods divided 
by its relative price must equal the marginal utility of the consumption of the non-
tradable good. In other words, for any given level of the consumption of the tradable 
goods, we can derive the demand of the non-tradable good as a function of the relative 
price between these two goods. Equation [A-15] has a similar interpretation, in the sense 
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that a demand function for real money holdings that depends on the cost of holding that 
stock of money can be obtained. Equation [A-16] indicates that the path of the 
consumption of the tradable goods is piece-wise constant. This is a consequence of 
assuming perfect capital mobility, and also of assuming that the rate of time preference 
equals the interest rate in the rest of the world. 
A.4 The Resource Constraint for the Aggregate  Economy 
Consolidation of the private sector and the government results in the balance of payment 
identity 
[A-17] ( )T T TdV iV X c gdt = + − −   
where the V is the sum of private sector’s (b) and government’s (bG) non-monetary 
wealth. 
Expressions [A-16] and [A-17] are sufficient to solve the system. Knowing the domestic 
total non-monetary wealth of the country, given by past history, the level of consumption 
of tradable goods adjusts instantaneously to guarantee that the stock of foreign assets 
will not be changing over time. It should be noticed that the consumption of the tradable 
goods does not depend on either some nominal variable or the real exchange rate. In 
particular the level consumption of tradable goods equals T T Tc iV X g= + −  (see the 
phase diagram in Figure A1, which is characterized by the existence of a saddle point, 
not a saddle path). 
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V0 
V 
cT
dV/dt=0
cT=iV+XT-gT
Figure A1 
The determination of the equilibrium in the economy 
The marginal condition [A-10] (or [A-14] in the particular case of the utility function we 
have chosen) determines the unique level of the real exchange rate ε that clears the 
market of non tradable goods at its full employment long-run level FHX . We denote the 
long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate with εF (see Figure A2). It should be 
remarked that the long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate depends on the 
consumption of the tradable goods. 
If the price of the non-tradable goods is full-flexible, then, any change in the 
determinants of the demand function for the non-tradable goods is offset by a change in 
that price level such that the agents are “persuaded” to consume the full-employment 
level of production of the non-tradable goods. In this case, the real exchange rate 
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remains at the level εF at all points in time. On the other hand, if the price of the non-
tradable goods is fixed, any change in the determinants of the demand function for those 
goods will not be able to be accommodated by the necessary change in their nominal 
price, and the market will stay out of its long-run equilibrium level. In this case, the level 
of consumption will differ from the full-employment level of production. This case 
could be interpreted as a short-run situation, in which the market for the non-tradable 
goods is demand-determined. The intermediate case is when the price of the non-
tradable goods is characterized by a sluggish adjustment toward its equilibrium level. In 
the particular case of the adjustment process we specify in our work (equation [67]), we 
should observe that, for a given level of consumption of the tradable goods, the market 
for the non-tradable goods should return to its long-run equilibrium with movements 
along the demand function. 
cH 
ε 
cH = (α/β) ε  cT
εF 
XFH
Figure A2 
The non-tradable-goods market 
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APPENDIX B 
MATHEMATICAL DERIVATIONS 
B.1 The Return on Nominal Money Holdings  
The price of nominal money holdings is given by the inverse of the price level fo 
tradable goods. Therefore, the instantaneous return on nominal holding is the 
instantaneous proportional change on its price. In an economy under a hard peg regime 
the only source of changes in the domestic price of the tradable goods is the international 
price of the tradable goods. We have assumed that that price follows a random process 
of the form dP dzσ= . Then, applying Ito’s differentiation, 
[B.1] ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 111 2E P E Pd d PE P P P∂ ∂= +∂ ∂  
that results in 
[B.2]
( ) ( )22
2
1 11
1 1              
d d z d zE P E P E P
d z d t
E P E P
σ σ
σ σ
= − +
= − +
 
where we have considered the fact that (dz)2=dt. Multiplying both sides of equation 
[B.2] by EP, we obtain the instantaneous proportional return on money holdings 
[B.3]
( )
( ) 2
1
1
d E P d t d z
E P
σ σ= −  
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B.2 The CRRA Utility Function and the Marginal Conditions 
In Chapter II we introduced the CRRA utility function, which we repeat here for 
convenience, 
[B.4] γβαβαγ )(
1),,( 1 −−= mccmccU THTH  
The marginal utilities if each of its arguments are given by 
[B.5]
( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
( , , )( , , ) ( )
( , , )( , , ) ( )
( , , )( , , ) 1 ( )
H T
H H T H T H T
H
H T
T H T H T H T
T
H T
m H T H T H T
U c c mU c c m c c m c c m
c
U c c mU c c m c c m c c m
c
U c c mU c c m c c m c c m
m
α β α β γ α β α β
α β α β γ α β α β
α β α β γ α β α β
α
β
α β
− − − − − −
− − − − − −
− − − − −
∂= =∂
∂= =∂
∂= = − −∂
The marginal conditions to be fullfiled at all points in times expressed in [27] and [28] 
are derived by introducing the results of [B.5] in equations [24] and [25]. 
B.3 The Function G and the Indirect Utility Function 
The function G was defined as ( )2H TcG c m i σε= + + − . We defined the share of 
each of the term on the right-hand-side as 
[B.6]
( )2
 
H T
H T m
m ic cg g g
G G G
σ
ε
−= = =  
Using the marginal condition [27] we can write 
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[B.7]
H TG g G g
α β=  
which is a possible solution if and only if gH=α and gT=β. Using equation [25] and 
following the same procedure it can be determined that gm=(1- α −β). By equation [B.6], 
we derive that 
[B.8]
( )
( )2
1
H Tc G c G m Gi
α βα ε β σ
− −= = = −  
Finally, replacing these results in the utility function [B.4] we obtain the indirect utility 
function 
[B.9]
1
2
1 1( )U G G
i
γα β
α β αα βα β εγ σ
− −⎡ ⎤− −⎛ ⎞= ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
with the marginal utility of the consumption of the tradable goods that can be expressed 
as 
[B.10]
1
1
2
1
TU Gi
γα β
α β α γ γα βα β εσ
− −
−⎡ ⎤− −⎛ ⎞= ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
Combining [B.10], [20] and the guess function [35], we obtain G equals 
[B.11]
( ) ( )1 / 11
2
1G A v
i
γγ α β
γα γβ φ α γα βγα β εσ
−− − −
− − −⎡ ⎤− −⎛ ⎞= ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
Finally, replacing [B.11] in [B.9] and after several manipulations we obtain equation 
[36]. 
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B.4 The Transversality Condition 
The transversality condition to be fulfilled is given by 
[B.12] 0 0lim [ ( , , ) ] lim [ ( , , ) ] 0
t t
vt t
Exp vJ v t e Exp J v t eρ ρε ε− −→ ∞ → ∞= =  
where the expectation of the function ( , )J v ε  is derived by using [44] and [45], and 
equals 
[B.13]
( ) ( )2 2 21 1 1
2
0 [ ( , , )]= ( , , 0)  
f t
Exp J v t J v e
γ γ γ σ φ φ σ γφσε ε
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤+ − + − −⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  
B.5 The Complete Solution for the Differential Equation 
The complete solution for the differential equation is the sum of the particular and the 
complementary solutions 
[B.14] 1 2(1 ) 1 2( , )J v Av K v K v
ω ωγ γ β γ γε ε ε ε−= + +  
For the complementary solution, the partial differential equation we need to solve is 
given by the expresion 
[B.15] 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 0
2 2 2v vv v
J fvJ v J J v Jεε ερ σ ε σ εσ− + + + − =  
where the candidate guess function we use has the form ( ),J v Kvγ ωε ε= . 
Introducing the appropriate derivatives of the guess function we obtain a a quadratic 
expression given by 
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[B.16] ( ) ( )2 2 2 21 1 11 1 0
2 2 2
fσ ω σ γ ω γ γ γ σ ρ⎡ ⎤− + + + − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
and solving for ω we obtain the two roots of the complementary solution, which are 
described in equation [50]. 
B.6 The Smooth-Pasting Conditions 
The complete solution for the differential equation is the sum of the particular and the 
complementary solutions. In this particular case of a lower bound policy , the constant 
K2 equals zero, and the complete solution takes the form 
[B.17] 11( , )J v Av K v
ωγ γα γε ε ε= +  
The smooth-pasting condition states the derivative of the value function with respect to 
ε, where ε is valuated at its lower bound level, should equals zero. That is 
[B.18] 1 11 1 1( , ) 0J v Av K v
ωγ φ γ
ε ε φ ε ω ε −−= + =  
which results in a value for K1 given by expression [57]. 
When a lower and a upper bound are established, then two smooth-pasting conditions 
should be fulfilled. Those conditions are 
[B.19]
1 2
1 2
1 11
1 1 2 2
1 11
1 1 2 2
( , ) 0
( , ) 0
J v Av K v K v
J v Av K v K v
ω ωγ φ γ γ
ε
ω ωγ φ γ γ
ε
ε φ ε ω ε ω ε
ε φ ε ω ε ω ε
− −−
− −−
= + + =
= + + =  
These two equations form a system with two unknowns (K1 and K2) that can be resolved. 
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After some manipulations the results are given by [65]. 
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APPENDIX C 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
A Parameter of the guess function for the differential equation 
on J(v,ε) 
A Parameter of the guess function for the differential equation 
on J(v,ε) under a real exchange rate lower bound 
A
r
 Parameter A under sluggish non-tradable goods price 
b Individual’s stock of foreign bonds 
bG Government’s stock of foreign assets 
cH Consumption of non-tradable goods 
cT Consumption of tradable goods 
dNL Non-negative non-decreasing process that is only positive 
when the real exchange rate hits the predefined lower level 
dNH Non-negative non-decreasing process that is only positive 
when the real exchange rate hits the predefined upper level 
dτ Lump-sum transfers 
E Nominal exchange rate (units of the domestic currency per 
unit of the foreign currency) 
Exp(.) Expectation operator 
G Individual’s total expenditure 
G Final expression for individual’s total expenditure under 
fixed non-tradable goods prices and a lower bound on the 
real exchange rate 
  
92
 
G
r
 Function G under sluggish non-tradable goods price 
gH Proportion of total expenditure spent on non-tradable goods 
gm Proportion of total expenditure spent by holding money 
(opportunity cost) 
gT Proportion of total expenditure spent on tradable goods 
H Non-tradable goods domestic price 
J(v,ε) Function H(v,ε) under a real exchange rate lower bound 
Jt First derivative of the function J(v,ε) w.r.t. time 
Jv First derivative of the function J(v,ε) w.r.t. v 
Hvv Second derivative of the function J(v,ε) w.r.t. v twice 
Jvε Cross derivative of the function J(v,ε) w.r.t. v and ε 
Jε First derivative of the function J(v,ε) w.r.t. ε 
Jεε Second derivative of the function J(v,ε) w.r.t. ε  twice 
 
 i Real interest rate on international bonds 
K1,2  Parameters of the complementary solution of the 
differential equation on J(v,ε) 
L[.] Stochastic differential operator (see Turnovsky (1997)  
M Nominal money stock 
m Real money stock 
N Cumulative interventions on the nominal exchange rate 
P International price of the tradable good 
q ( ) ( )2 28( )1 4 1 fρ γγ γ γ σ
−+ + + +  
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qr  ( ) ( )
2
2 2
2 ( ) 8( )1 4 1
F gκ ε ε ρ γγ γ γσ σ
⎡ ⎤− −+ − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
R Stochastic return on total individual’s wealth 
Rb Stochastic return on foreign bonds 
RM Stochastic return on money holding 
T Domestic price of the tradable good (denominated in 
domestic currency) 
U(cH,cT,m) Individual’s utility function 
UH Marginal utility of non-tradable goods consumption, first 
derivative of the function U(cH, cT, m) w.r.t. cH 
Um Marginal utility of money, first derivative of the function 
U(cH, cT, m) w.r.t. m 
UT Marginal utility of tradable goods consumption, first 
derivative of the function U(cH, cT, m) w.r.t. cT 
V Sum of private sector’s (v) and government’s (vG) real 
wealth 
v Individual’s total wealth 
v(0) Individual’s stock of total wealth as of time t=0 
Var(.) Variance operator 
vb Proportion of total individual’s wealth held in bonds 
vG Government’s total wealth 
vM Proportion of total individual’s wealth held in money 
XH Flow endowment of non-tradable goods 
F
HX  Equilibrium level of production of non-tradable goods 
XT Flow endowment of tradable goods 
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Λ  Lagrangian multiplier 
α Parameter of relative significance of consumption of non-
tradable goods in the utility function 
β Parameter of relative significance of consumption of 
tradable goods in the utility function 
ε Real exchange rate 
ε(0) Real exchange rate as of time t=0 
εF Real exchange rate compatible with targeted level of 
production of non-tradable goods 
ε  Upper bound on the real exchange rate 
ε  Lower bound on the real exchange rate 
φ Parameter of the guess function for the differential equation 
on J(v,ε) 
γ Parameter of relative risk avertion 
κ Parameter of non-tradable goods price degree of 
sluggishness 
ρ Rate of time preference 
σ Non-negative parameter that amplifies the Wiener process 
ω1 Negative root for the complementary solution that solve the 
differential equation on J(v,ε) 
1ωr  Negative root for the complementary solution that solve the 
differential equation on J(v,ε) under sluggish non-tradable 
goods price 
ω2 Positive root for the complementary solution that solve the 
differential equation on J(v,ε) 
2ωr  Negative root for the complementary solution that solve the 
differential equation on J(v,ε) under sluggish non-tradable 
goods price 
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[ ]0),0(),0( εvΩ  
0
0
  ( , , ) tH T MM a x E x p U c c v v  e  d t
ρ
∞
−⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
=Ω ),,( tv ε  ( , )te J vρ ε−  (in time separable form) 
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